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A US-Japan Comparison 
 
Elmer Huh and Sarah McLellan 
 
As Baby Boomers retire in the US and Japan over the next several years, the reality of rapid 
population aging will begin to set in, which is sure to foster a sense of urgency regarding whether 
current standards of living can be maintained over the next several decades. In particular, with the 
graying of human assets and steady declines in the dependency ratio,1 countries like the US and 
Japan will tend to ask their retirees to secure more of their retirement income from private sources.  
The corporate pension plan will play a key role in this revised social contract, and the quest 
for higher investment returns portends growing dependency on overseas economies to grow 
seniors’ retirement assets.  In particular, there will be a rising attention to issues of pension reform 
and corporate governance.  Exacerbating this trend are recent changes in accounting standards 
taking place around the world.  In the past, tax authorities were the primary influence over 
corporate pension plans and behaviors, but their purview was understandably focused domestically 
on tax receipts and consumption behavior. In contrast, in the future, accounting regulators have a 
broader, global mission to benefit all users of financial information – stakeholders that cross 
national borders and traditional tax jurisdictions. According to the US Financial Accounting 
Standards Board (2005: 1), one important aspect is to “promote the international convergence of 
accounting standards concurrent with improving the quality of financial reporting.” 
This enhanced corporate financial reporting surely helps correct informational asymmetries 
and transaction costs that have plagued financial reporting in the past, particularly regarding 
corporate pensions. But, in turn, this disclosure influences corporate behavior and investor 
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decision-making, having a measurable impact on corporate valuation. In addition, these accounting 
changes set off and signal a period of more fundamental corporate restructuring as companies 
respond to the new accounting standards as a chance to reorganize and drive deeper financial 
reforms.  
Against this background common to both Japan and the US, it is useful to compare how 
pensions in Japan have changed as that country emerges from its restructuring efforts, to the US 
which is now initiating new pension reform.  A common tension characterizes the business 
environment in both countries, on the one hand seeking to preserve the current pension system, and 
on the other, building corporate integrity, trust, and competitiveness through reform, increased 
transparency, and good governance. On the national level, there is also a clash of power among 
government, political leaders, regulators, corporations, media, and labor which is producing unique 
reforms. At the same time, globalization of capital flows and competition, as well as regional 
investment shifts imposed by changing demographics, increasingly necessitate that national 
pension systems become more easily translated. These forces are working together to remold and 
align corporate pensions against the backdrop of this century’s demographic revolution. 
 
Impact in Japan: Half Financial, Half Personnel.  
In 2000 at the low point of Japan’s so-called “lost decade,”2 pension accounting standards 
were introduced, and subsequently became a tool leveraged by Japanese companies to alter the 
employment contract. Of course, the CFOs of Japanese companies needed to grapple with pension 
accounting standards and new requirements for on-balance exposure of pension reserve liabilities. 
However, concurrently, many companies sought to shift away from the rigid steepness of the 
seniority-based lifetime employment contract. In particular, corporate executives viewed a shift to 
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the flatter flexibility of a performance-based wage profile as a key restructuring prerogative.3 
Inextricably linked to the rigidity of the old employment contract was the traditional Defined 
Benefit (DB) lifetime pension model; restructuring pensions then became linked to finding a 
solution. Accordingly, beyond mitigating the immediate financial risk that underfunded DB plans 
posed to corporate balance sheets, companies also sought to change pensions so as to accomplish 
broader personnel initiatives. This included realigning employee incentives under performance-
based measures, increasing the transparency of compensation costs and benefits, and fostering self-
responsibility for post-retirement planning. In sum, implementing the new pension accounting 
standards in Japan led to the integration of these complementary personnel objectives while at the 
same time reducing corporate financial exposure. 
 
Accelerating the Shift Away from Traditional Pension Plans: The US Impact  
Defined Benefit (DB) plans in the US have been traditionally concentrated in unionized 
and mainly manufacturing industries, sectors where employers retain workers for long periods of 
time and expect to honor lifetime employment contracts.  The DB plan then becomes a mechanism 
to attract and retain employees and, in many cases, to induce early retirement. Yet these are also 
the sectors characterized by low or even negative growth over the last four decades. And in the 
higher growth economic sectors, Defined Contribution (DC) plans proved popular for more fluid 
labor markets where long-term worker retention was no longer considered  paramount (Mitchell, 
2005).    
Pension accounting changes are re-emerging in the US, partly attributable to the recently 
passed Pension Protection Act (PPA) of 2006. While these changes are being phased in slowly, it 
is nonetheless clear that the PPA will accelerate two developments underway for some time. First, 
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there has been a long-term trend toward freezing of traditional Defined Benefit (DB) plans in favor 
of Defined Contribution (DC) or hybrid plans. Second, there has been a trend of re-allocating 
pension assets towards longer-duration bonds (Berner, 2006; Berner and Harris, 2005). 
One feature of the US system that is notably absent in Japan is the Pension Benefit 
Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), the government-sponsored insurance entity created under the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974. This is a guarantee program to 
protect workers with vested DB pension benefits. It has been charged with creating moral hazard 
since DB sponsors do not bear the entire default risk of their plans and it has permitted persistent 
benefit underfunding.  The government has sought to mitigate these problems with minimum 
funding levels, premiums assessed to insure the companies’ obligations, and tax break incentives to 
companies to pre-fund their plans.4  But the system has proven unable to keep up, and the PBGC is 
currently facing billions of dollars of underfunding (United States Government Accountability 
Office (GAO), 2006). 
Over the long haul, the continuing movement away from traditional DB toward DC plans 
will eventually remove corporate funding exposure. This evolutionary process of courses places on 
workers’ and retirees’ shoulders the responsibility to save, manage interest rates and investments, 
and protect against longevity risk.  In the US, the social costs of this shift have become an impetus 
for pension legislation. As James Wooten (2006: 4) notes, “the PPA [Pension Protection Act] 
includes provisions that attempt to make 401(k) plans better vehicles for retirement savings by 
expanding participation, increasing contributions, and improving investment management.” 
Whether the PPA will ultimately lead to the strengthening of the DB system, or whether it will tip 
the scales away from DB plans, is still in question. Yet many believe that simpler, more transparent, 
and leaner DC pensions will become the plan of choice for US companies.  
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The Japanese Reforms: Looking Back and Looking Forward 
 Traditional DB pension plans in Japan came under scrutiny with the introduction of 
pension accounting standards in the year 2000. At the time, companies were faltering under the 
weight of underfunded pension liabilities and persistent recessionary trends (Nikkei Business, 
2003). Expectations ran high that the Defined Contribution Act of 2001 would provide necessary 
relief and set off a wave of plan conversions from traditional DB to new DC plans.  
Yet, it soon became clear that the wide-scale adoption of DC plans, modeled after the US 
401(k), would not occur. The negligible shift towards DC plans is attributed by some to a corporate 
commitment to long-standing employment contracts and a paternalistic culture. Under that view, 
benevolent corporate managers might foresake change to uphold their DB promises to the bitter 
end, even at the cost of insolvency.  But this interpretation is inconsistent with Japanese 
companies’ lobbying effort for further deregulation and their public stance in favor of DC plans. 
As seen in Figure 1, many employers terminated their Employer Pension Funds (EPFs) from 1995, 
with noticeably higher termination rates from 1999 until the time of the pension reform legislation 
in 2001-2002. In other words, companies were not standing behind paternalistic norms or lifetime 
employment contracts even before the DC legislation was enacted. To make sense of the lukewarm 
response to the Japanese DC innovation, we take a step back and consider what happened just prior 
to the reform. 
Figure 1 here 
Evolving Tradition. The tradition of corporate pensions in Japan can be traced back to the Edo 
period (1603-1867), when tradesmen provided employees with a lump-sum retirement allowance 
in recognition of long years of service. Eventually, this custom evolved into a supporting pillar of 
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the lifetime employment contract. Embedded as such, the notion of pensions as a reward for long 
service proved difficult to discard at the bursting of the “Bubble.” An unfunding (or underfunding) 
of pension assets was consistent with the lifetime employment contract concept because payouts 
were withheld until retirement. Moreover, nonfunding was consistent with the tax treatment of 
contributions and benefits, a common driver of funding levels across countries. 
When corporate pensions formally developed in Japan after WWII, the tax rules did not 
allow companies to expense current contributions or assets set aside for pre-funding.  That is, 
strictly speaking the rules did allow it, but they also required an offset to the employee in the form 
of a current tax obligation regardless of whether the employee was actually receiving any benefit 
then or 30 years from then.  To maintain labor harmony, companies typically made concessions to 
workers which would exactly offset their current tax burden. As a result, companies found it more 
convenient to simply not pre-fund their DB pension promises.  
Given the youthful employee base and favorable economic times, the unfunded system 
worked smoothly for many years with minimal cash or funding risk. As the employee base aged 
and the recession deepened, the system revealed its flaws.   
The Slow Shock: Demographics. The true extent of Japan’s demographic woes began to emerge 
in the 1990s when the inadequacy of the public pension system became apparent. Medical 
advances and standard of living improvements had elevated Japanese longevity to the highest in 
the world.  At the same time, economic changes and societal trends were favoring smaller families 
and lower fertility rates. The public system’s Pay-as-you-Go (PAYG) structure, which finances 
retiree benefits primarily from active worker taxes, became viewed as no longer sustainable 
compared to the post WWII period. The interplay of demographics and pensions can be best 
understood by comparing the population age distribution pyramids in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2 here 
The dramatic demographic shift has meant that the PAYG public pension system will have 
difficulty fulfilling benefit promises to an expanding base of retirees while the contribution base is 
shrinking. To make matters worse, benefit promises had been raised considerably during the high-
growth period in a deliberate effort to share the fruits of the period with those no longer in the 
workforce. Finally, the growing government deficit that emerged in the aftermath of the bubble 
economy is unlikely to result in a government bailout.  In other words, the threat of public pension 
insolvency has put increasing pressure on corporate pensions to take on a greater role in Japan’s 
retirement equation. 
The ‘Big Bang’ Shock: Pension Accounting Standards.  At the same time, the globalization of 
accounting standards also puts pressure on Japan to adopt more stringent pension accounting and 
disclosure requirements.  Some deemed Japan’s old approach to pension accounting as unfair, a 
source of hidden liabilities, and a false source of global competitiveness. Adopting pension 
standards consistent with modern accounting practice, however, requires treating pensions as 
deferred compensation. This means the operating expense on the income statement and the liability 
on the balance sheet represent the present charge and net present value of the obligation, 
respectively (with various mechanisms to smooth the short-term gains and losses over time). 
Introducing pension liabilities on the balance sheet and disclosing the full extent of pension 
underfunding in the footnotes made transparent, for the first time, the shaky status of corporate 
pensions and their inability to assume a stronger role in the three-legged stool of retirement 
provision (Berner, Boudreau, and Peskin, 2006).5 In other words, the introduction of pension 
accounting standards was a shock to the system because it heightened awareness over the need for 
corporate restructuring. 
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The Restructuring Corporate Challenge.  Even companies which wanted to restructure found 
that the Japanese tradition of a lifetime employment contract made it difficult to do so nimbly. 
Procedural and legal red-tape governing layoffs, as well as the associated social stigma, reinforced 
labor market rigidity and encouraged firms to freeze hiring instead of laying off existing employees. 
At the same time, the traditional lifetime employment contract implied a steep lifetime salary 
profile, so many companies wished to replace seniority-based increases with pay-for-performance 
metrics, particularly as Baby Boomers aged.6 In terms of pensions, the overhaul or redesign of a 
pension plan was far from simple, especially when it was needed as an element of a broader 
personnel initiative to revise the lifetime employment contract.  
Meanwhile, a so-called “perfect storm” was brewing in the Japanese macro-economy, 
bringing with it serious consequences for companies with DB plans struggling under the new 
pension accounting standards. Near-zero interest rates reduced the discount rate used to calculate 
the pension benefit obligation (PBO), while low investment returns reduced actual and expected 
returns on pension plan assets. Taken together, these factors expanded pension underfunding and 
further exacerbated low margins at Japanese companies.7  
The urgency created by new accounting standards made apparent certain inadequacies in 
the system: 1) “daiko henjo”, or the putback of the government portion of the company’s DB plan; 
2) options to convert rather than dissolve DB plans; and 3) an improved safety net for retired 
beneficiaries. Solving these problems proved difficult. 
Political Deadlock. Discussions about DC plans surfaced in 1996 under the Hashimoto Cabinet. 
At the time, Prime Minister Hashimoto garnered hope from the U.S. example and the spectacular 
growth of DC or so-called “401(k)” plans.8  While in the US, 401(k) plans provided a mechanism 
to stimulate savings, debate over DC legislation in Japan was launched just when the nation’s 
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saving rate was under foreign criticism for being too high and its imports too low. This political 
beginning and deference to the U.S. model were considered fatal flaws by some in the bureaucracy 
who viewed this as a serious miscalculation of the complexities of pension reform (Wakasugi, 
2003; Yano, 2003). 
By the time the Japanese Diet passed its DC law, it was 2001 and three cabinets later, with 
the country now led by Prime Minister Koizumi. At that point, expectations had both soared and 
soured. Many US entrants from the 401(k) business had cut their losses and pulled out of Japan. 
Companies and market participants had been disappointed several times with delays and issue 
reprioritization (McLellan, 2005). Even some confident that the reforms would eventually pass 
were aware that Japanese politics might change the law in the final hour.  Accordingly, most 
companies preferred to wait before implementing any massive plan design changes. For example, 
even IBM, with its vast experience implementing DC plans around the world, lamented over how 
it had to move slowly as a result of the uncertainty and ambiguity associated with the timing and 
eventual form of the legislation (Roin, 2003; Tsubota, 2003).  
When the DC Act was passed, it disappointed many. In its original form, the maximum 
contribution limit had been set at ¥432,000 (approximately $3,600) per year for employees of 
companies lacking alternative pension systems, and ¥216,000 (approximately $1,800) per year for 
employees with other types of pension plan offerings.9 These caps meant that many companies 
could not fully convert existing plans.  The DC legislation also prohibited early withdrawals 
(before age of 60) and did not permit employee contributions. This kept the assets small and 
locked-in.  By contrast, the U.S. 401(k) system integrated more features of a tax-deferred saving 
system based on employee contributions primarily, with employer-matching pension features 
secondarily. Also, the US maximum annual contribution limit for individuals at that time was 
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much higher, at $10,000. Withdrawal exemptions further helped employees liquidate or take a loan 
against their pension assets under special circumstances such as higher education, first-time house 
purchase, or financial duress. 
The form and timing of the Japanese DC legislation suggest not that paternalism held sway, 
but rather that other factors came into play.  At the same time, the Japanese pension legislation 
undoubtedly influenced the overall picture of corporate pension reform.  The changing pension 
accounting standards began to tip the scales in favor of difficult restructuring programs and 
eventually even employment contracts began to be revised.   
Unintended Consequences. The low contribution caps set forth in the DC legislation prevented 
many Japanese firms from fully converting their existing DB plans to DC plans, so some firms 
have turned instead to Cash Balance (CB) plans. These are a hybrid plan type permitted under the 
Defined Benefit Occupational Pension Act of 2002, and they appear to be a good “fit” for many 
companies as they combine good features of both pension structures. For instance, the CB accrual 
pattern is flatter than in a traditional DB plan, so the common restructuring goal of reducing the 
steepness of the seniority-based wage curve in favor of performance-based mechanisms could be 
achieved with this new tool. Furthermore, CB plans are consistent with the historically appropriate 
Japanese shared-burden or compromise approach to problems.10 
Since DC plans lack the positive personnel attributes of DB plans and shift the entire 
investment risk to employees, they are not necessarily a win-win for all employers and employees. 
Older employees, in particular, are less familiar with making personal investments, so the learning 
curve and risk aversion associated is large. Soft freezes, which let older employees remain in the 
DB plan but close entry to younger workers, has the effect of speeding up the cash requirements 
since the plan is primarily paying out benefits. The transition to a DC plan is complex requiring the 
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expertise of pension consultants and actuaries. Within the company, an employee public relations 
campaign must be followed by investor education programs.11  
Nevertheless, some industries prefer DC plans because of high-levels of turnover and a 
younger employee base that responds well to investment and self-responsibility (Shimizu and 
McLellan, 2006). This is true for instance in the retail sector, which has benefited from some 
lobbying by the business community. In October of 2004, the maximum allowable nontaxable 
contribution by employers was boosted considerably, and the following year, the restrictions on 
withdrawals were relaxed. As of the end of June 2006, over 7000 companies had introduced DC 
plans in Japan, up 51 percent from the prior year (Nikkei Shimbun, 2006). DC adoption rates are 
also higher at smaller companies because they lack the scale and resources required to set up and 
manage a DB plan. Many of these companies also face a looming deadline for their tax-qualified 
pension plans (TQPP) facing extinction in 2012. For these companies, DC plans still offer an 
attractive conversion option. 
Looking Ahead: the 2007 Problem. In overview, the recent pension restructuring patterns in 
Japan can be seen with some optimism. The economy is emerging from a prolonged recession and 
Japanese corporate pension have restructured in important ways. Yet the so-called “2007 problem” 
looms, which is when Japan’s Baby Boomers begin to retire en masse.  Over one-third of firms 
deems this “a crisis,” and over 80 percent of firms plan countermeasures (Ministry of Health, 
Labour, and Welfare, 2006). Specifically, hiring and retention are becoming increasingly important 
given anticipated talent shortages, and DB plans seem to offer an effective HR management tool 
that DC plans do not.  In other words, Japanese corporate pension plans may continue to be 
reoptimized, to assist human resources strategy rather than simply managing balance sheet 
liabilities.  
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Turmoil in the US Pension System 
In the US, the last five years have been a period of negativity and crisis-mongering in the 
pension arena, leading many firms to re-evaluate their plan offerings. Between 2000 and 2004, 
equity returns were terrible, and, coupled with low interest rates, DB pension funding sank. These 
shifts brought about the need for change in pension plan regulations and pension management, and 
disclosing the true unfunded liability on the balance sheet rather than burying it in the footnotes.  
The general thrust of recent regulatory and oversight has been to clarify discrepancies 
between plan assets and promises made to current and future retirees.  The Financial Accounting 
Standards Board (FASB) recently proposed amending the US Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (GAAP) to require companies to eliminate pension smoothing on their balance sheets 
and disclosure of pension obligations.  Over time, FASB will seek to align US standards with the 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) adopted by the International Accounting 
Standards Board (IASB). In general, the effort has been to mark-to-market both pension assets and 
liabilities. In response, some firms have already frozen their existing pension plans while others 
have switched active employees to DC plans.   
In addition, legislation is in place to reshape existing DB plan funding rules, making it 
more difficult for most firms to let their plans evolve to a precarious state.12   New funding 
requirements also reduce smoothing, accelerate amortization of past costs, and increase premiums 
per beneficiary. The goal is to shore up the PBGC which is now facing substantial shortfalls. This 
new legislation will have some short term impact on companies, but its impact will ultimately 
compound reforms in financial reporting and capital market pressures to force companies to make 
more structural changes.  For example, in the wake of other scandals, rating agencies are 
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scrutinizing more carefully how they treat unfunded post-retirement liabilities of all sorts.  
Lowered ratings will surely increase borrowing costs down the road, particularly if rating agencies 
count the DB plan equity exposure as a form of corporate leverage.  Specifically, additional risk 
would be seen to arise from mismatches in the duration of the plan assets returns relative to the 
expected time frame of beneficiary payouts.   
 
Conclusions 
Corporate pension plans in both the US and Japan face substantial challenges which are 
demanding new strategies.  Future reforms will respond to accounting standards and pension 
reform legislation, as well as corporate governance pressures. For instance, proactive management 
teams will need to take pension financing into account when making overall corporate finance 
decisions, including more tax efficient funding and trading strategies. Companies will also deem it 
necessary to hold more fixed income and alternatives, versus equities, as part of a move towards a 
more sophisticated approach of matching DB plan assets against liabilities. These strategies may be 
useful in preserving the DB plan structure, whereas those who freeze DB plans or establish only 
DC plans, may find they cannot well address the risks worrying workers and beneficiaries. A 
related point is that DB plans may become increasingly useful in addressing long-term HR 
objectives, a goal that we expect to become important in an aging world.   
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Figure 1. Number of Terminated Employee Pension Funds (EPFs) 
 
 
Source: Pension Fund Association, 2006. 
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Figure 2.  Distribution of Japanese Population by Age: Demographic Pyramids 
a) 1950 
 
b. Projected for 2010  
 
Source: National Institute of Population and Social Security Research (2006) 
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Endnotes:  
                                                 
1 This term refers to the ratio of the working-age population (age 15-64) to persons 65+. In 1950, 
there were 50 working age persons per older; by 2050, the ratio is expected to drop to 2.5 to 1 in 
the US, and just 1 to 1 in Japan (Siegel, 2006). 
2 The “lost decade” in Japan refers to the period of economic stagnation following the bursting of 
the bubble. 
3 Underlying this was the structural shift of ownership structure and, specifically, the shift from a 
dominant bank governance model to an increasingly foreign-based shareholder ownership structure 
(McLellan, 2006). 
4 Under the Japanese commercial code, companies do not have the same incentives and can legally 
operate some types of pension plans highly underfunded without penalty (or safety net). 
5 The three-legged stool represents i) corporate or public pensions, which defer compensation; ii) 
personal saving, in which individuals defer consumption; and iii) the government safety net, which 
makes promises based on future economic growth. (Berner, Boudreau, and Peskin, 2006). 
6 In a traditional lifetime employment wage model, younger employees were paid less than their 
contribution in the early years of employment to induce retention. As older employees, they would 
recoup the “lost wages”, but in effect, the company was paying back a loan to employees at a cost 
higher than their current productivity. 
7 Near-zero rates indicate that the present value and the future value of the labor obligations are 
almost the same making the obligation much more “near-term”. In comparison, US companies 
calculate pension obligations on rates roughly 650 basis point higher. This difference indicates that 
the risks of cash flow requirements are more short-term oriented in Japan, all else equal. 
8 DC plans became popular in the U.S. starting in the late 1970s after Congress added §401(k) to 
the tax code (1978) and the US Treasury issued regulations outlining their requirements (1981). 
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9 Based on October 2001 levels (approx $1 = ¥120). 
10 Cash balance plans have been controversial in the US due to allegations of age discrimination. 
However, recent court decisions have reversed some of the controversy, providing hope that hybrid 
plans may once again gain favor among US companies (United States Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit, 2006). 
11 Plan conversion requires union approval or two-thirds employee consent. 
12 Some industries such as airlines still receive special breaks (i.e. amortization periods and funding 
durations extended), indicative of political willingness to continue to subsidize non-competitive 
industries. 
